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IS NIGERIA READY FOR INFLATION TARGETING?
BY
Mbutor O. Mbutor'
for understanding the reaction of the

intermediate targets to shocks in
money supply. For countries that
hitherto applied exchange rate

targeting, the attraction to lT is usually
rationalized in terms of the central

bank being able to implement
domestic monetary policy without
undue deference to changes in the
exchange rates ofthe lead currency.

Generally,

lT should, among other

things, lead to a low and less variable

inf lation, and foster greater
confidence in the financial markets

So deepening them, as well

Mbutor O. Mbutor

'1.

lntroduction

lnflation targeting (lT) can be seen as

as

increasing coordination belween
govern ment and monetary
authorities, guide inflationary
expectations. Recent empirical
evidence for emerging market
countries

an operational expression of the
pursuit of monetary stability. lt has
become f ashionable since its

suggests that lT outperforms other
monetary regimes as measured by
inflation expectation and volatility in

scanty literature and great

reserves (Batini and Laxton, 2005).

introduction by New Zealand in
1989/90. Though, with relatively

the output gap, exchange rate,
interest rate and international

controversy, several countries see lT

as more preferred to other The Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN)
frameworks for im plem e nting had recognized the need to transit to
monetary policy with regard to inflation targeting as the framework
addressing contemporary for implementing monetary policy.
developments in the financial system.
This realization was supported by key
Monetary authorities in th ese speakers at the international financial
countries argue that targeting

conference, (FSS2020) held at the

longer

Transcorp Hilton, Abuja in June 2007.
The aim of this paper is therefore, to
access the prospects and challenges
forimplementing lT in Nigeria.

monetary aggregates

no

delivers satisfactory results since the

relationship between monetary
aggregates and the money multiplier
has become less clear. The unclear

link between money supply

and

inflation is usually explained in two
arguments. one, financial markets
have become so developed that
assets are now stored in several
financial derivatives and diverse
portfolios, such that the exact
composition and or cfaracter of

The rest of the paper is presented in

the following order; Section

2

contains defi nitions of terminologies
often used while discussing lT while,
section 3 describes the preconditions
the

for lT. ln Sections 4 and 5,

prospects and challenges for lT in
Nigeria. are highlighted, respectively.

money supply is not easy to predict.

The last section concludes the paper

Two, the observed instability in money

2. Common Terminologies in lT
2.1 lnflationTargeting

multiplier renders the adoption of the
base money as the operating target
ineffective by not creating an avenue

'Mbutor

is

at Economist in rtc

the Manqgenent
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lnflation targeting has
Depart

nent,

a

relatively

short history and is generally difficult to
d

efin

e

with

in the

classical

macroeconomic constructs (CMCs)
which are usually expressed in terms
of aggregate demand and supply and
without a clear statement about the
obiectives of central banks. However,
the increased acceptance of lT has led
to the evolution ofvast literatu re on the
delinition of the term. Thus far, there
has not evolved a unique definition
that suits all economic practitioners.

Svensson (2001a) describes lT as a
framework in which the primary goal of
monetary policy is to achieve price
stability in the form of an inflation
target, also recognizes that some
weight should be given to stabilizing
output movements around potential

output. This definition however,
appears too simplistic and has not
brought out clear features for the
characterization of inflation targeting.

Also, Bernanke and Mishkins 1997;
King 2002; Kurtner and Posen 2000
see lT as an exercise of 'constrained
discretion'. The constraint is always
the inflation target while the discretion

is the inbuilt stability that ofiers
decision makers some allowance to

take account of short

run

considerations. From operations point
of view, this definition appears suitable

in the sense that it

enables

a

visualization of a typical central bank's
reaction function. Usually, reaction
functions are expressed in terms ofthe
policy variable which should minimize
the departure of actual inflation from a
set inflation target, actual output from
the known potential output and actual
rate of unemployment from the natural
rate of unemployment.

As an introductory definition, lT as a
framework for monetary policy
implementation simply describes a
policy framework in which central
banks accept and announce the
realization of certain forecast targets
of inflation, over a given time period,
as the measure policy anchor and are

accountable for deviations of actual
inflation from the settargets.
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2.2

E

leme

nts of lnflation

Targeting
The elements describe the foundation
upon which the adoption of lT is built.
According to Eichengreen (2001), lT
implies "monetary policy operating
strategy with four elements:

.

an institutional commitment to
price stability as the primary
goal of monetary policy

I

mechanisms rendering the
central bank accountable for
attaining monetary policy goals

.

the public announcement of
targets for inflation: and

.

a policy of communicating to the

public and the markets the
rationale for the decisions taken
by the central bank"

2.3

Forecast

Ta rg

lnflation

ets

of

The forecast targets represent the
numeric value of inflation rate which
the central bank uses as the anchor

for

monetary policy. Usually, the

forecasts are obtained using
econometric models and informed

judgments. The inflation target could
be expressed as a range (i.e 3 to 6
percent as in South Africa) or a point
target (i.e 2.5 per cent as in United
Kingdom). lf the target is a range then
the chances of the central bank to
meet the target will be higher but with
diminished credibility compared with a
point target. There is no hard rule

regarding the time within which the

inflation target would be achieved.
Whereas inflation performance is
measured annually in most countries,

Australia adopts a medium term
evaluation period (3 years). The
targets could be set by the central
bank brthe government, or jointly.

2.4

Choice of the Target
lnflation Forecast

It is not in doubt that price stability is
the main objective of monetary policy
for most countries. However, as price

are measured by
different indices, the choice of which
developments

index to target is less easy to arrive at.

For most countries, the consumer
price index is used as a measure of

aggregate

prices.

Pe rce ntag e

changes in the consumer price index
are called inflation rates. However, the

percentage changes could be

expressed

in

terms

of core or

headline. Headline infl ation measures
changes in the CPl, including all the
commodities in the consumer basket,

subordinate the achievement of the
inflation objective on other monetary
policy goals.

measures

There is also an alternate

changes in CPl, isolating itemswhose
prices are volatile and depend on
seasonal factors such as energy and
food. The choice of core or headline

of price stability as overriding. The two

while core inflation

inflation has implications for the
monetary authority. lf the latter is

chosen, it will be easy for the central
bank to communicate such to the
public thereby avoiding confusion and
earning higher credibility. However,

the downside risk of this choice is a
high probability of missing the target
since the factors affecting some key
components of the consumer basket
are unpredictable.

On the other hand, the core measure
allows a greater chance of meeting
the target since the 'troublesome'
variables are isolated. However, the
central bank could lose credibility
among the publicwho more often than
not are under the impression that the
inflation measure is manipulated.
Most countries adopt the headline
measure of inflalion but provide
es@pe clauses that absolve the
central bank of blames when the
target is not met on conditions outside

normal circumstances. Armenia

is

one example ofsuch a country.

2.5

Types oflnflation Targeting

ln the literature, inflation targeting has

been classifled into three broad
categories. These include Full
Fledged (FFIT), Eclectic (ElT), and
lnflation Targeting Lite (lTl). FFIT
countries commit to their inflation
target and are fully transparent in their
pursuit of the goal. Newzealand is
usually sighted as an example of FFIT

countries. Eclectic inflation targeting
countries actually commit to
maintaining low inflation rates but do
pursue other competing policy
objectives. This group of central
banks does not necessarily need to
be fully transparent in the conduct of
monetary policy. A common example
usually cited is the United States of
America. The inflation targeting lite
countries do announce inflation
targets as overriding objectives but do
not have the credibitity and the
protean policy wherewithal to achieve
the ob.jectives. ln other words, these

central banks, in practice,
12

classification of lT which seeks to
classify it in terms of the extent of
commitment to the singular objective

types include Full Responsibility
lnflation Targeting and Partial

Responsibility lnfl ation Targeting. The

former describes central banks which
target point inflation forecasts and are
held fully accountable for deviations
from targets.

2.6

The Reaction Function of
Central Banks

The reaction function of central banks
operating inflation targeting describes
a simplified monetary sector model
which must be minimized at any
decision point. The reaction functions
are usually customized to suit the local
needs of the economy and the local
needs are expressed in terms of the
observed linkages between a policy
instrument and the financial market
and the real economy. However,
generally, central banks are inc ned to
minimize the function:
i,

= ao + a,i,., + 6r1E(lnf),.,-(lnf)"') +

a3yr-1 + a4aer.1+

auAm,.,__

1

I is any chosen short term
policy interest rate, E(lnf) is expected
inflation, lnf forecast target inflation, y
output gap, m is groMh in money
aggregates.
Where

The inclusion of monetary aggregates

in the function explicitly asserts that
inflation is ultimately a monetary
phenomenon. Therefore, the central

bank will focus on using all its
instruments to ensure that the
monetary aggregates do not grow
above set thresholds. However, it
should be clear that strictly speaking,

the monetary aggregates are not
intermediate targets but merely
provide an additional guide to the
deployment of policy tools. Some of
the instruments available to central
banks for the controt of liquidity
include. Open Market Operations,
Discount Window Operations, Repos
and others.
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3.0 Preconditions for
successful lmplementation
oflnflation Targeting

The nature of inflation targeting

policy, and technical considerations.

.

Centralbanks
independence implies,

The management of the central
bank is free from interferences by
politicians and other stakeholders
and this is usually assured by
ap

p

ropriate legislations

constraining the removal by fiat of
the leadership ofthe central bank

I

The central bank can generate its

income, pay its bills without
needing subventions from the
The central bank is not underany
obligation to fund the expenditure

The pursuit of price stability as the
primary objective of monetary
policy must have public support

A clearly defined objective
of monetary policy implies
that
Price stability must be clearly
stated as the main objective ot
monetary policy
There should not be multiplicity of
policy goals

Technical considerations
include

I

a

There should also be expertise in
monetary operations

a

There

shou

ld be sufficient

knowledge about the flnancial
system

4.0

The Prospects of lnflation
Targeting in Nigeria

4.1

The Debate

Whether to adopt inflation targeting in
Nigeria or not is a contentious subject
among economists. Egbon (2007)
opines that given the fact that inflation
targeters have experienced low and
stable inf lation rates without

necessarily sacrificing economic
growth and the advantages, including
clarity and transparency, itwould have
been a challenge for Nigeria to adopt
inflation targeting as a framework for

There must be expertise

now. According to the author, the
difficulties are hinged on the fact that

the vast informal sector in

the

Nigerian economy would make it
difflcult to predict the fundamentals of
inflation targeting, and that the
implementation of lT would be
truncated by vested interests and the

Advances (no fiscal dominance

3.3

instruments

for the implementation of lT is dim, for

of the governmenl, especially
through Ways and Means

3.2

monetary policy to ensure the
right deployment of the policy

a

to deploy its inslruments in

government

I

transmission mechanism of

The centralbank has the freedom

policy (instrument autonomy)

o

The know-how for identifying the

conducting monetary policy. He,
however, suggests that the prospect

manner it deems fit in the
implementation of monetary

.

I

is

such that monetary authorities focus
directly on the achievement of the
forecast target without necessarily
isolating an intermediate target. The
implication of this is that there should
abound resources, financial and
political at an inflation targeting
central bank. These rgsources are
termed preconditiois. B road ly
speaking, the preconditions for
effective inflation targeting could be
grouped into three groups namely,
independence of the central bank, a
clearly defined objective of monetary

3.1

forecasting inflation so that the
forecasttarget is reliable

in

political uncertainty of 2007.

The issues raised by the author call
for real concerns. lt is agreeable that
the informal sector should be given
some financial inclusion for monetary
policy effectiveness. ln this direction,
mention should be made thatthe CBN
considers micro-crediting as a major
thrust and has put in place schemes
like the interest drawback to ensure

occurs. ln addition, the publication of

the summary of monetary

policy
committee (MPC) meeting decisions,

and the holding of public discourse
such as thg monetary policy forum
and conferehce, as well as speeches
by top managemenl have provided
the Bank with the oppo(unity and
mechanism of enhancing policy
advocacy, transparency and

accountability. Another major
contribution by Uchendu (2007) is the

fact that fiscal dominance is being
gradually nipped wit h the

establishment

of the

cash

management committee by the
federal government empowered,
among other things to synchronize
the government cash releases with

inflows. His views therefore, point to
the fact that Nigeria could commence

implementing lT.

Operationally, Mbutor (2007) in
supportofthe adoption of lT in Nigeria

has argued that the bases for
adopting monetary targeting in
Nigeria have waned owing to the
observed instability of the money
multiplier. According to him, monetary

in Nigeria is conducted
using the broad money aggregate as
the intermediate target. The base
money, which is the operating target,
is the sum of bank reserves and
targeting

currency

-in circulation. At

the

Operations Departments of the Bank,
policy instruments are targeted at the

base money with the view that the
broad money would react in the same
measure as the base money since the
multiplierdoes not change. That is,
l\42 = Bm - -

-----------------2

M2 is broad money, B, base money
and m, the constant money multiplier.

Since m should remain constant in
theframework, then
AM2 = AB

3

that small borrowers are not crowded
out in the credit markets

a denotes change

Uchendu (2007) while evaluating the
preconditions for lT, asserts that the

However, the graph below shows that
the money multiplier has been on the

of the Bank (CBN) in
consolidating, liberalizing the
success

increase since 2000. Therefore, for
the central bank to continue tinkering

operating environment has improved

with the base money with the belief

its credibility, and the depth and health

that shocks to it would be transmitted
proportionately to the intermediate
target can only produce sub optimal
results. ln addition, the author has

of the financial markets, which is the

medium in which the transmission
mechanism of monetary policy
43
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necessarily show strong
correlations with the computed

Generally, the experience from

4.2 Current View on the

emerging economies which transited
to inflation targeting showed that all

Targeting in Nigeria

excess liquidity, an indication that the
hypothesized causation from liquidity
surfeitto high inflation is notclear

the preconditions for take off were not

shown that

do not

infl

ationary developments

met at the time of transition, rather

some fell in place post lT
implementation (table'1

Preconditions for lnflation

4.2.1

Central Bank lndependence

. The CBN Act 2007 has
guaranteed

)

the tenure of

Graph 1. Multiplier, 1993-2005

3
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Table 1. Conditions met at the Outset of lT introduction in Emerging Markets
Conditions

Countries

Price Stabilityas ilaior goal of policy
Price stability with other goals
Central Bank instrument autonomy
Absence of fi scal dominance
(Access to central bank credit

Colombia, Hungary Korea, others
Brazil, Chile, Czech Republic

Limited/prohibited)

Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Czech Republic

Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Czech Republic

Transmission mechanism well unde6tood
Basic atoutset

Brazil, Chile, Czech Republic
Thailand, Turkey

Efforts Continue

Reasonable degree of control over short term
lnterest rate
Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Czech Republic
oevelopment of fi nancial markets
Welldeveloped
SouthAfrica,lsrael
Reasonably well developed
Brazil, Chile, Korea, l\rlexico, Peru
Less developed
Romania
Reasonably stable fi nancial system

Brazil, Chile, Korea, Mexico, Peru

Source; called from Era Dabia-Nonis (2007)
Please note thatthe table is abridged.
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Management

of the

Bank

objectives of the Bank shall be to

ensure monetary and price
stability, issue legal tender

Section 8, Sub section 2 states

that the Governor and Deputy

currency

Governors shall be appointed in
the first instance for a term of 5
years subject to a reappointment
for another 5 years. However, in
section 11 , the Act states that the
Governor and his Deputies could
be removed from office on
grounds of ill health, criminal
conviction other than road trafflc
offences, bankruptcy, disqualifled
from performing learnt profession
in Nigeria. The President may
also remove the Governor subject
to confirmation by at least twothirds ofSenate.
a

The CBN has financial autonomy
as the responsibility of approving
the Bank's budget lies with the
Board of Directors ofthe Bank.
a

The share capital has

been

increased to 100 billion and isfully

subscribed only by the federal
government. The Board also has
the power to recommend to the

President for approval of a
desired increase in the share
capital.

No chance for fiscal
dominance. The Act states that
the CBN can only allow credit to
government to the tune of 5 per
cent of the previous year's
revenue. More importantly, such

debts must be retired before

another can be taken and can not
be paid forwith a promissory note
or any other bill that the CBN can
under write. For example, the
budget deficit for 2004 fiscal year
was barely 1.5 per cent of GDP ln
2005, the deficit was 1.1 per cent
of the GDP, far lower than the 2.8

per cent programmed in the
budget and 3 per cent

convergence criterion ofthe West
African Monetary Zone.(WAMZ).

4.2.2 Clearly Defined Monetary

.

a

.

Policy Objectives

The CBN now has the

clear
objective of monetary and price

stability. The Act 2007 reads in
that the principal
Section

2

It is worthy of note that the burden

ofthe unholy trinity, where interesl

rates. inflation rates

and

exchange rates were being
simultaneously managed has
eased. The Act has specifically
entrusted the Board with the

responsibility to determine the
appropriate exchange rate of the

to deploy its

instruments in whichever manner
it deems fit for the implementation
of monetary policy

Nigeria, maintain

to safeguard
the value of the Naira, promote a
sound financial system in Nigeria
and act as banker and provide
economic and financial advise to
the government.

The Act also grants the CBN the

autonomy

in

external reserves

Naira, using suitable parameters.

4.2.3

TechnicalConsiderations

As listed under the preconditions, the

consolidation exercise has given the
Central Bank leverage in terms of
credibility. The stability in the sector
has caused increases in foreign direct
part, is
investments. This
responsible for the soaring market

in

capitalization of the Nigeria Stock

exchange. More so public issues by

Nigerian companies since the
consolidation exercise have all been
over subscribed. The point that can
be deduced from this is that more and

more. the informal economy

will ultimately effectuate

understanding

monetary

policy.

5.

Challenges

of

lnflation

Targeting in Nigeria
Although the prospects for inflation
targeting in Nigeria is bright, a few
challenges still abound, and relate to

thefollowing.

availability of the know-how for
forecasting inf lation and 5.1

the dynamics of

transmission mechanism of monetary

is

becoming flnancially included. This

The Need to Sustain the
Stability in the Financial
System

policy is prerequisite for adopting
inflation targeting. At the Central

After the consolidation

Bank

investor confidence has risen sharply.

of

Nigeria, the Research

Department has concluded studies on
the dynamics of inflation in Nigeria.
The document has already been

presented

at the

exercise,
several indicators have shown that

Moreso, the sheer size

of

the

consolidated banks has boosted their

single obligor limits, ensuring that

Department's
fortnightly departmental seminar. The

large projects could easily be funded.

predictive power was also tested and
the results were generally impressive.

intermediation. This

Also, the Department

has
on the

stu d ies
transmission mechanism of monetary

commissioned

policy in Nigeria and the outcome of
the study is being reviewed for public
presentation. There are also ongoing
individual research works on the
transmission channel of monetary
policy.

ln terms of the choice of operating
target, the Bank since December
2006 had begun to adopt interest rate
as the operating target. The policy rate
is called the monetary policy rate
(MPR) and is operated with lower and
upper bounds. The Standing Lending

and Deposit Facilities,

alongside

special repos and reverse repos have
been introduced to ensure limited
volatility of the weighted interbank
rates.

4.2.4
The

Otherprospects

success from the banking
45

It has also led to

better
in turn would

ensure that the transmission of
monetary policy through the financial
system to the real sector is effective.
Consequently, a major challenge for
the CBN is to ensure that this

confidence does not dwindle.

Specifically, such ill experiences like

the crisis observed in Spring Bank
early in June, 2007 must be avoided.
ln this regard, the board ofdirectors of
deposit money banks and other
financial institutions should be made
to realize that while pursuing profit

and other incentives for
shareholders, care should be taken to
avoid acts that would jeopardize the
operating environment in general.

5.2

Flow of lnformation

The importance of information flow
cannot be over emphasized in the
development of the financial system.

Smooth information flows enable
investors to identify investment
opportunities. Particularly, credit
information enables savers and fund

July - Sept. 2008
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seekers to ascertain the best avenues
to deal in. This should reduce the cost
of funds and deepen the financial

markets.

As regards,

inflation

targeting, the challenge of information
flow relate to the need to let the

stakeholders know the reason for it,
and ensure a total buy-in. When there

is

sufficient acceptance

of

the

message, then expectations of future
inflation should converge around the
announced targets. Thus, making the
dynamics of financial indicators more
predictable

5.3

Data lssues

lnflation targeting thrives

in

an

environment \ivith quality and timely
data. The challenge for Nigeria is in
three folds. One, there is the need to
ensure that data, especially monetary
and price statistics, are reliable. Two,

the data must be

received

contemporaneously, without any lags.
Three, the frequency of data collection
should also be high. Currently, the
collaborative surveys of the CBN,
NBS, and NCC are on annual basis.
Since monetary policy actions should
be gauged in quarter and half yearly,

the surveys should be

more

frequently. The challenge here is the
funding required for this exercise.

5.4

Howto Measure
Expectations?

lnflation targeting should mould the
expectations of stakeholders. But the
challenge for the CBN is to develop

suitable measures of inflation
expectation, and identifying when

purposes

of

monetary operations,

would it also accept to bear the cost
there from? Two, The CBN Act 2007
has also limited the ability of the
government to borrow from the CBN.
The opportunity cost of this action is
the Iost interest income on the credit to
government. Therefore, the challenge
here concerns the need forthe Bank to

work out modalities to cover

the

anticipated loss in income.

changes have occurred.

6.

5.5

The primary goal ot the paper was to

Costof lmplementing lT

The autonomy granted the CBN has
an aspect which is usually over
looked, which is the question of who
bears the interest rate cost incurred in

liquidity management operations.
Can the CBN bear it all alone? This
situation is made more precarious by

two factors. One, lf the favourable

fiscal outlook of the federal

government is sustained, then, its
need to issue treasury bills would be
reduced. As a result the CBN would
have to issue its own bills for liquidity
operations, and of course bear the
cost.Also, even if the govemment has
to issue its securities mainly for the

16

Conclusion

expose the prospects and challenges

facing the implementation of inflation
targeting in Nigeria. To put the subject

in

proper perspective, common

terminologies often used in discussing
lTwere defined. The preconditions for
effective lT were also highlighted. The
paper has argued that most of the
preconditions met in other jurisdictions
before transition to lT are currently
presenl in Nigeria. Notwithstanding

some of the challenges that still lie
ahead, it is concluded that Nigeria
should begin to transit to inflation
targeting framework for c,onducting
monetary policy
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